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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 2010, approximately three million cable TV
subscribers across the New York metropolitan area lost access to their local
1
Fox stations and missed the first two games of the World Series.
Previously, on March 7, 2010, nearly 3.1 million households lost their local
2
ABC signal and missed the first fourteen minutes of the Academy Awards.
In 2008, 1.5 million Time-Warner subscribers lost access to fifteen
3
broadcast stations in fifteen local markets for one month. For nearly one
month in 2007, seven hundred thousand Mediacom subscribers in twelve
states lost access to twenty-three stations including affiliates of Fox, ABC,
4
NBC, CBS, and the CW. In 2005, seventy-five thousand cable subscribers
in Missouri, Louisiana, and Texas lost access to their local Nexstar
5
broadcast affiliates for nearly one year. Examples of these types of signal
6
blackouts date back even further.
More recently, on February 18, 2011, Univision pulled its broadcast
7
signal from 7,000 Rhode Island households for three months. In March
2011, DISH Network consumers in seventeen markets lost their CBS,
8
FOX, NBC, and CW signals for six days. In September 2011, LIN TV
pulled eight broadcast signals from the Mediacom cable systems in Florida,
Michigan, and Indiana causing blackouts for nearly 1.2 million subscribers
9
that lasted nearly six weeks. Multiple other blackouts have occurred this
10
year. Each of these blackouts was the result of failed negotiations
11
between the cable or satellite provider and the broadcaster.
1. Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 2718, para. 15 (2011) [hereinafter NPRM].
2. Id.
3. MICHAEL L. KATZ ET AL., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER HARM FROM THE
CURRENT RETRANSMISSION CONSENT REGIME 44 tbl.6 (2009), http://97.74.209.146/down
loads/analysis_consumer_harm.pdf.
4. Id. at 43 tbl.6.
5. Id. at 42 tbl.6.
6. Id.
7. Deborah D. McAdams, Full Channel Cuts Deal with Univision to Replace WUNITV, TVTECHNOLOGY (May 16, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://www.televisionbroadcast.
com/article/120480.
8. See Comments of The United States Telecom Ass’n at Exhibit 1, Amendment of
the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel.
May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Telecom Comments].
9. LIN Pulls Stations from Mediacom, TVTECHNOLOGY (Sept. 1, 2011 10:15 AM),
http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/123970; Merrill Knox, LIN Stations Restored for
Mediacom Subscribers, TVSPY (Oct. 17, 2011, 10:26 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/
tvspy/lin-stations-restored-for-mediacom-subscribers_b25517.
10. See, e.g., Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at Exhibit 1.
11. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 15.
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Under the current regulatory scheme, broadcasters and cable
providers must enter into negotiations with each other for permission to
12
retransmit a broadcast signal over a cable system. The vast majority of
these retransmission consent negotiations are resolved privately, without
government intervention and without the loss of broadcast signals to cable
13
subscribers. However, sometimes the negotiations reach an impasse, and
the result can be signal blackouts for cable subscribers. When this happens,
consumers are inevitably harmed.
Recently, there has been a growing dispute between cable providers
and broadcasters about how to deal with such breakdowns in negotiations.
While cable providers call for reform of the retransmission consent
14
regulations, broadcasters resist government intervention. Meanwhile, the
FCC has recognized the problem facing consumers and recently initiated
15
proceedings to try to solve it. This Note will examine the contours of the
dispute between cable providers and broadcasters and discuss the possible
solutions to this growing crisis. In Part II, a brief history of the
retransmission consent regulations of the 1992 Cable Act is put forth as
16
necessary background information. Part III of the Note addresses the
positions that cable companies and broadcasters have taken in the dispute.
Part IV will discuss possible solutions to the dispute. Finally, Part V will
offer some recommendations and conclusions as to what the best solution
may be.

II. RETRANSMISSION CONSENT
Originally, cable television existed to serve locations that could not
17
receive broadcast signals. The cable company’s job was to take the signal
18
from the airwaves and retransmit it to a subscriber’s household. Initially,
the FCC maintained it had no authority over cable television because it was
12. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2006).
13. NPRM, supra note 1, at 2769 (statement of Comm’r Meredith Attwell Baker).
14. See generally Petition for Rulemaking to Amend the Commission’s Rules
Governing Retransmission Consent at 2, Petition for Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 10-71, 1
(filed Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Petition]; Reply Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters
at I, Exec. Summary, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission
Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter NAB Comments].
15. See NRPM, supra note 1.
16. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
1992 Act].
17. Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the
Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 99, 101 (1996).
18. Id. at 104.
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not a “broadcaster” covered under the 1934 Communications Act. But as
cable systems added “distant” signals, broadcasters began to view cable as
a viable alternative; and the FCC, to avoid disturbance of its broadcast
20
regulation, decided to regulate cable as well.
In the mid-1960s, in order to protect local broadcasting, the FCC
required cable companies to carry the local broadcast signal when the cable
21
signal competed for audience with the broadcast signal. Noting the vast
growth of the CATV industry (the equivalent of cable) and the value of
broadcasting, the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable upheld these must22
carry rules as within the FCC’s authority. However, the Court restricted
the authority to regulate cable to “that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation
23
of television broadcasting.”
In 1984, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to
provide a national policy regarding cable television, effectively eliminating
the “reasonably ancillary” standard required by Southwestern Cable and
24
allowing for direct regulation. However, in 1985, the D.C. Circuit held
that the must-carry rules as implemented “are fundamentally at odds with
25
the First Amendment” and struck them down. The FCC scaled down the
26
rules, but in 1987, the same court struck them down again. This set the
stage for the next wave of regulation.
In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection
27
and Competition Act (“1992 Act”). Congress found that broadcast
programming was the most popular programming on cable systems and
that cable systems obtained great benefits from local broadcast signals,
which had historically been obtained without the consent of the

19. Id.
20. Id. at 105.
21. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV
Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, paras. 85, 87 (1965);
Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the Grant of
Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV Signals to
Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, paras. 48–49 (1966).
22. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 162, 178 (1968).
23. Id. at 178.
24. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
25. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
26. Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
27. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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28

broadcaster.
The system resulted in an effective subsidy of the
development of cable systems by local broadcasters, which in turn resulted
29
in a competitive imbalance between the two industries. To right this
imbalance, Congress amended Section 325 of the Communications Act to
enable each local commercial broadcast station to elect every three years
whether to proceed under the revised must-carry requirements of Section
30
534 or the new retransmission consent requirements of Section 325.
The policy of the 1992 Act was to “promote the availability to the
public of a diversity of views and information” and “ensure that cable
television operators do not have undue market power vis-a-vis video
31
programmers and consumers.” The FCC and Congress have consistently
maintained that there is an interest in protecting local broadcast stations
because of the perceived special role that broadcast television plays in civic
32
life. Together, must-carry and retransmission consent rights provide
significant benefits for broadcasters by ensuring they can obtain carriage
33
and continue to provide important local programming to viewers.
Imposing modified must-carry rules, the 1992 Act requires each cable
operator to carry the signals of local commercial broadcast television
34
stations. The must-carry rules were enacted out of the concern that
without intervention, cable’s dominance in the market could result in local
35
broadcasting being blacked out. The 1992 Act’s version of the must-carry
rules was upheld as consistent with the First Amendment by the Supreme
36
Court in Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC in 1997. In the early years
after the adoption of the Act, most broadcasters selected must-carry status,
37
but by 2009, only 37 percent of stations relied on must-carry.
The second option available for broadcasters under the 1992 Act is
38
retransmission consent. Under Section 325(b), cable operators cannot
retransmit a commercial broadcast signal without the station’s express
28. Id. § 2(a)(19), 106 Stat. at 1462.
29. Id. § 2(a)(19), 106 Stat. at 1462–63.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B) (2006).
31. § 521(a)(21)(b)(1), (5).
32. Barbara S. Esbin et al., Retransmission Consent: A System in Need of Reform, 1032
PLI/Pat 205, 213 (2011).
33. Id. at 214.
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a).
35. Randolph J. May, Broadcast Retransmission Negotiations and Free Markets,
PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS (Free State Foundation, Potomac, Md.), Oct. 18, 2010,
at 2, http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/ Broadcast_Retransmission_Consent_
Negotiations _and_Free_Markets_101610.pdf.
36. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
37. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 5 n.13.
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
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consent. Thus, a broadcaster who chooses retransmission consent over
must-carry must negotiate with cable companies and other multichannel
video programming distributors (“MVPDs”) for consent to retransmit its
40
signal. Recognizing the benefits cable providers obtained from carrying
broadcast signals, “Congress adopted its retransmission consent provisions
to allow broadcasters to negotiate to receive compensation for the value of
41
their signals.”
Congress intended to establish a marketplace for
retransmission rights, but did not intend to “dictate the outcome of the
42
ensuing marketplace negotiations.”
Originally, Congress provided no substantive standards governing
43
retransmission consent negotiations. However, in 1999, Congress adopted
new regulations, which required broadcasters engaged in retransmission
44
consent negotiations with MVPDs to negotiate in good faith. The FCC
believed that “by imposing the good faith obligation, Congress intended
that the Commission develop and enforce a process that ensures that
broadcasters and MVPDs meet to negotiate retransmission consent and that
such negotiations are conducted in an atmosphere of honesty, purpose and
45
clarity of process.” However, this statute was not intended “to subject the
retransmission consent negotiations to detailed substantive oversight by the
46
Commission.”
Under Section 325(b)(1)(A), if a broadcaster and an MVPD are
unable to reach an agreement, then the MVPD may not retransmit the
47
broadcaster’s signal. Because the plain language of the statute says that a
broadcaster’s signal cannot be retransmitted without consent, when
negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs break down, the lack of
48
consent leads to a possible blackout of the broadcast signal. When
retransmission consent is revoked as a result of failed negotiations, “the
result is to leave consumers literally in the dark, a result hard to square with
49
the Commission’s overall mission to protect the public interest.”
39. Id. § 325(b)(1)(a).
40. See NPRM, supra note 1, at paras. 2–3.
41. Id. at para. 4.
42. Id. at para. 7 (quotation mark omitted).
43. Id. at para. 8.
44. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C).
45. Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, First
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5445, para. 24 (2000) [hereinafter Good Faith Order].
46. Id. at para. 6.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A).
48. Petition for Rulemaking to Amend the Comm’n’s Rules Governing Retransmission
Consent, Petition for Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 10-71, 26–27 (filed Mar. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Petition].
49. Esbin, supra note 32, at 238.
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III. THE CURRENT DISPUTE: WHAT EACH PARTY WANTS
Since the 1992 Act, the marketplace has changed considerably.
Historically, MVPDs compensated broadcasters for retransmission consent
through in-kind compensation, but today, “broadcasters are increasingly
50
seeking and receiving monetary compensation.” Additionally, in 1992,
broadcasters often only had a single local cable provider that could
retransmit their signal, but the rise of competitive video programming
51
providers means that broadcasters now have more options. Consumers
52
also have more options for receiving programming.
Partly as a result of these market changes, retransmission consent
negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs “have become more
53
contentious and more public.” While the 1992 Act was intended to
protect consumers by ensuring them cable access to their local TV stations,
the retransmission consent issue has “morphed over the years into a fight
between well-financed special interests to see who could best game the
54
rules to their own advantage.” This section of the Note examines the
positions of the major players in the dispute.

A.

Cable Providers

According to cable providers, the retransmission consent scheme is
55
broken. In March 2010, fourteen cable companies, MVPDs, and interest
groups filed a Petition for Rulemaking (“Petition”) arguing that the
56
retransmission consent regulations are outdated and harming consumers.
They believe that the current rules, largely unchanged since 1992, “are illsuited to curb the negotiating tactics employed by broadcasters that place
57
consumers in a no-win position.” “[B]roadcasters’ manipulation of the
58
current regime,” along with consumer harm and changes in the media
59
landscape, mean it is time to reconsider the retransmission regulations.
In 1992, Congress acted out of concern that cable companies were
acting as monopolies that threatened the public interest benefits associated

50. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 2.
51. See id.
52. These options include direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, telephone
providers that offer video programming, and the Internet. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 47 (statement of Comm’r Michael J. Copps).
55. See Petition, supra note 48, at 35.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 7–8.
59. Id. at 1.
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with broadcasting. But today, the increased number of cable providers in
the market means that it is the broadcasters that enjoy distribution options
61
far beyond incumbent cable companies. Because of this, broadcasters
have more “incentive and ability to hold up MVPDs for ever-higher
62
retransmission fees,” and can easily exploit their new-found bargaining
63
leverage to harm consumers.
While Congress originally expected
64
broadcaster demands for compensation to be modest, the shift in
negotiating power to broadcasters has resulted in considerably higher
65
fees.
The problem is that negotiations between broadcasters and cable
66
providers do not take place in a free market. “Rather, . . . negotiations
occur in the context of a federal law and regulation overlay that mixes
elements of private bargaining with forced-access and protectionist
67
elements.” These artificial constraints result in cable providers being
68
unable to freely negotiate in the bargaining process. Thus, cable providers
are caught “between a rock and a hard place: pay spiraling carriage fees
and raise consumer rates, or be forced by broadcasters to drop local
69
signals.” In both situations, the consumer is harmed.
Cable providers proposed that the FCC adopt solutions that will keep
consumer costs low and eliminate a broadcaster’s incentive and ability to
70
use signal blackouts as a negotiating tactic. They believe the current rules
fail to give the FCC the tools to battle “unreasonable price demands and
71
hold-up threats” by broadcasters. First, they propose that the FCC adopt a
new dispute resolution framework, including “compulsory arbitration, an
72
expert tribunal, or similar mechanisms.” To trigger such mechanisms, an

60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 7
64. Id. at 4.
65. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 13; see also Press Release, SNL Kagan, SNL Kagan
Releases Broadcast Retransmission Fee Projections Through 2017 (May 25, 2011)(on file
with Press Release Distribution, http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/8483711.pdf)
(reporting one consulting firm’s estimate that retransmission fees could rise 28% this year,
from $1.14 billion to $1.46 billion).
66. Petition, supra note 48, at 7.
67. May, supra note 35, at 2.
68. Id.
69. Petition, supra note 48, at 1.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id. at 32.
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MVPD would merely need to show that negotiations had broken down. A
74
showing of bad faith would not be required. Cable providers argue that
the FCC’s authority to adopt such mechanisms stems from Section 303(r),
which states that the FCC can make such regulations and prescribe
restrictions and conditions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of Section 325, which includes establishing dispute resolution
75
76
procedures. The FCC has ordered similar arbitration in the past.
Second, cable providers urge the FCC to adopt interim carriage.
Where a cable provider shows a willingness to negotiate for continued
carriage of a broadcast station, the broadcaster “should not be permitted to
77
withhold retransmission consent while such negotiations are pending.”
Interim carriage should be provided for in two situations: 1) while
broadcasters and MVPDs continue to negotiate a renewal agreement in
78
good faith, and 2) while a dispute resolution proceeding is pending.
Similar, to the proposed dispute resolution mechanisms, interim carriage
would be available on a simple showing that negotiations had broken down
79
and would not require showing bad faith.
Interim carriage would eliminate “brinkmanship as a negotiating tool”
80
and ensure “that negotiations produce reasonable and noncoercive rates.”
It also would prevent broadcasters from “undermining the government’s
interest in localism by . . . withholding their signal from a substantial
81
portion of the viewing public.” Cable providers argue that authority to
82
adopt interim carriage stems from Section 325(b)(3)(A). When faced with
practices adversely affecting basic cable rates, the FCC is justified in
83
ordering interim carriage to protect consumers.

73. Id.
74. See id. at 32–33.
75. Id. at 33; 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2010).
76. See General Motors Corp. & Hughes Elec. Corp., Transferors & The News Corp.
Ltd., Transferee, for Auth. to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 473, para. 222 (2004) [hereinafter News Corp. Order] (requiring News Corp. to
submit to binding arbitration with DirecTV or any other requesting MVPD and establishing
rules for such arbitration).
77. Good Faith Order, supra note 45, at para. 59.
78. Petition, supra note 48, at 36.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id.
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A) (2010). Providers point to the statute’s mandate that
the FCC “establish regulations to govern the exercise by television broadcast stations of the
right to grant retransmission consent.” Id.
83. Petition, supra note 48, at 38.

626

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64

Blackouts and related broadcaster tactics increase pressure on MVPDs
84
to accept less than favorable offers. It is clear that “MVPDs today devote
substantial time, money and energy to retransmission consent
85
negotiations.” Also adding to the costs of retransmission consent
negotiations is the fact that “[w]hen those negotiations break down . . . ,
they devote additional resources to managing the impact of that dispute on
86
their subscribers and the marketplace.” The increasingly high costs to
MVPDs of both the negotiation process and the final negotiated price are
one reason cable providers strongly believe that government intervention is
now necessary.

B.

Broadcasters

On the other hand, broadcasters, argue that the retransmission consent
87
scheme is working as intended. They urge the FCC to resist MVPD
88
requests to get involved. They believe that changes to the system are
unnecessary, outside the FCC’s authority, and would be harmful to the
89
public interest. As the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”)
puts it, “there is no legal, factual, or policy reason that broadcasters . . .
should not be permitted to negotiate for compensation for the signals that
MVPDs are reselling to their subscribers, or to be uniquely limited in the
90
type or amount of compensation they may even request.”
The comments of the NAB are largely indicative of the industry’s
91
opinion. NAB argues that when Congress adopted the 1992 Act, it did so
84. STEVEN C. SALOP, ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BROADCASTERS’ BRINKMANSHIP
BARGAINING ADVANTAGES IN RETRANSMISSION CONSENT NEGOTIATIONS 28 (2010),
www.americantelevisionalliance.org/downloads/Broadcaster_brinkmanship.pdf [hereinafter
BRINKMANSHIP STUDY].
85. Comments of Cablevision Sys. Corp. at 11, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 26, 2011)
[hereinafter Cablevision Comments].
86. Id.
87. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 14.
88. See Reply Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Brdcsters at i, Amendment of the
Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71, (rel. June
27, 2011) [hereinafter NAB Comments].
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12.
91. See generally Reply Comments of Tribune Brdcsting. Co., Amendment of the
Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June
27, 2011) [hereinafter Tribune Comments]; Comments of McGraw-Hill Brdcsting. Co.,
Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket
No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011) [hereinafter McGraw-Hill Comments]; Comments of
AllBritton Comm., Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent,
FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011); Comments of Comm. Corp. of Am. FCC
MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011); Comments of Granite Brdcst. Corp, Amendment
AND
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to ensure that broadcasters were not required to subsidize the establishment
92
of cable. Also, noting that a substantial portion of the fees MVPDs collect
represents the value of broadcast signals, Congress gave broadcasters the
93
ability to negotiate for compensation for that signal. Thus, the decision to
enact the retransmission consent provisions was an attempt to fix a market
imbalance and was grounded in notions of equity and fair competition
94
between broadcasters and MVPDs. NAB argues those policy rationales of
95
the 1992 Act remain equally compelling today.
While cable providers have two revenue streams, broadcasters have
96
only one and yet face similar programming costs.
Undeniably,
97
broadcasters provide valuable content to pay television providers.
Broadcasters use retransmission consent fees to continue to deliver this
high-quality content to viewers by covering the high costs of producing
98
local news. The fees also enable them to produce more and better local
99
programming. Depriving broadcasters of retransmission fees would thus
100
reduce the quantity and quality of content.
Furthermore, without these
fees, “[broadcast] stations could not compete on level terms with MVPDs
101
for viewers and advertising revenues.”
While fees have increased in
102
recent years, the higher price broadcasters demand today merely reflects
103
a “market correction.”
NAB argues that the FCC has correctly concluded that it lacks the
104
authority to mandate interim carriage or binding dispute resolution.
Section 325(b)(3)(A) provides no authority for the FCC to adopt changes
that would “override the clear congressional intent to establish a free
marketplace in which broadcasters could negotiate compensation” and
cannot “‘trump’ the absolute retransmission consent right in Section
of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71
(rel. May 27, 2011).
92. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 4.
93. Id. at 5–6.
94. Id. at 4, 6.
95. Id. at 4.
96. NPRM, supra note 1, at 2763 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
97. Id.; see also McGraw-Hill Comments, supra note 91, at 1. The comments note that
“[l]ocal broadcasters consistently and overwhelmingly deliver the most popular
programming available on any MVPD’s platform.” Id. at 2.
98. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at i.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 10.
101. See id. at 6.
102. McGraw-Hill Comments, supra note 91, at 2.
103. NPRM, supra note 1, at para 14.
104. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 24.
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325(b)(1).”
Even if the FCC did have such authority, it should not
106
micromanage retransmission consent negotiations
because government
intervention, or even an indication of government intervention, would slow
107
down negotiations.
NAB believes that adoption of many of the MVPD proposals would
“effectively amount to a government takeover of the substance of
108
retransmission consent negotiations.”
Instead, NAB argues that “the
FCC should focus on revising its notice rules . . . to ensure that consumers
have adequate information to make informed decisions in the event of a
109
rare retransmission consent impasse.” With adequate notice, a subscriber
110
can take action to protect access to programming it deems “must-have.”
This is the only proposed solution that will “directly impact and benefit
111
consumers.”
Additionally, NAB denies that broadcasters have increased leverage
112
due to increased MVPD competition, that retransmission prices are “too
113
high,”
and that “retransmission consent fees raise costs to
114
consumers.” Furthermore, service disruptions occur in only a handful of
115
instances, while thousands of agreements are reached uneventfully.
As
such, the position of broadcasters is overwhelmingly to resist government
116
intervention in negotiations.
Interference in the retransmission
marketplace would “undermine [the] system of free, local television
117
broadcasting that has served the American public so effectively.”

105. Id. at 20.
106. See id. at 3.
107. Letter from Gordon H. Smith, President and CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Brdcsts., to Julius
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC (Oct. 3, 2011).
108. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 34.
109. Id. at iii.
110. Comments of Nexstar Brdcsting., Inc. at v, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011)
[hereinafter Nexstar Comments].
111. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 71.
112. See id. at 13.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Comments of CBS Corp. at ii, Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Related to
Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011) [hereinafter CBS
Comments].
116. See NAB Comments, supra note 88, at i.
117. Joint Reply Comments of Barrington Brdcsting. Grp., LLC at 1, Amendment of the
Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June
27, 2011).
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Consumers

One consumer affected by the Academy Awards blackout is quoted as
writing: “[c]onsidering what I pay for cable . . . and the fact that if I didn’t
have cable, ABC would be free, I am having a hard time understanding the
118
119
issue.”
Her concerns are echoed by many other consumers.
Consumers are the innocent bystanders when broadcasters and MVPDs fail
120
to reach an agreement.
The primary harms facing consumers caught in the middle of a
retransmission dispute are potential or actual signal blackouts, rising cable
121
costs, and switching costs.
During contentious retransmission consent
disputes, consumers are faced with uncertainty about their ability to receive
122
certain broadcast stations. Threatened blackouts “may lead to consumer
123
uncertainty, anxiety, and anger.”
Actual blackouts cause cable
subscribers to lose access to desirable programming, especially when timed
124
to coincide with popular viewing events.
One study predicts that total industry retransmission fees will increase
from $1.14 billion in 2010 to $3.61 billion by 2017, causing average cable
125
subscriber fees to more than double.
Cable subscription prices rise
because retransmission consent fees are typically structured as a per126
subscriber fee.
Longer disputes or threatened disputes could cause
127
consumers to switch their cable provider and incur switching costs. But,

118. Matea Gold, Cablevision Customers Fume About Missing Oscar Telecast, L.A.
TIMES: COMPANY TOWN (Mar. 7, 2010, 4:45 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertain
mentnewsbuzz/2010/03/cablevision-customers-fume-about-missing-oscar-telecast.html
(quoting Kristin Barbetta).
119. See Comments of Michelle Erb, Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Related to
Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. Sept. 13, 2011) (“As a consumer,
I’d like to express our frustration at not being able to view certain programming that our
local Cable provider . . . is able to ‘blackout’ . . . .”); Comments of George Despotakis,
Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No.
10-71 (rel. May 31, 2011) (“How could this have escalated so badly and put the consumer,
the guy who ultimately pays the bills, in such a terrible position?”); Comments of H.
Freeman, Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB
Docket No. 10-71 (rel. Mar. 10, 2011) (“It’s grossly unfair for us to be held captive while
corporate greed controls the negotiations.”).
120. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 17.
121. See BRINKMANSHIP STUDY, supra note 84, at paras. 20, 23.
122. Id. at para. 16.
123. BRINKMANSHIP STUDY, supra note 84, at para. 14.
124. Id. at para. 21.
125. SNL Kagan Releases Brdcst. Retransmission Fee Projections Through 2017, supra
note 65.
126. BRINKMANSHIP STUDY, supra note 84, at para. 48.
127. Id. at para. 23; Petition, supra note 48, at 36.
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early termination fees may cause them to be unwilling or unable to switch
128
cable providers. In every situation the consumer incurs costs.
Consumers generally take the side of the cable companies, arguing
that their interests are being ignored. One group argues that the FCC
“should not lose sight of the fact that the viewing public is the intended
129
beneficiary of the system of must-carry and retransmission consent.”
After all, failure to protect consumers from actual or threatened blackouts
130
is not in the public interest.
Thus, consumer groups ask the FCC to
resolve the dispute without using consumers as “pawns in the battles
between giant cable, satellite, and telecommunications companies on the
131
one hand and massive broadcasting conglomerates on the other.”

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
While Congress did not intend the FCC to sit in judgment of the terms
132
of every retransmission agreement,
it is clearly time to address the
problem. The FCC has already proposed some possible changes to the
regulations that it believes might help resolve the issue. There are also two
other proposed rule changes, suggested by parties other than the FCC,
which are arguably outside the FCC’s authority and thus will necessarily
133
require action by Congress to implement.
This section of the Note
discusses these two groups of proposed solutions.

A.

FCC Proposals

On March 3, 2011, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent (“NPRM”) to assess whether the
134
current retransmission consent regulations were working effectively. The
FCC proposed, and requested comment on, four rule changes it believes
135
will allow negotiations to proceed more smoothly.
These proposed
changes are: 1) providing more guidance on good faith requirements; 2)
improving advance notice of possible service disruptions to consumers; 3)
128. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 16 n.50.
129. Reply Comments of Media Access Project at 1, Amendment of the Comm’n’s
Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June 27, 2011).
130. Comments of Consumer Action at 2, Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Related to
Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 31, 2011).
131. Comments of Nat’l Consumers League at 2, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011).
132. Good Faith Order, supra note 45, at para. 23.
133. NPRM, supra note 1, at 2763 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
134. Id. at para. 1.
135. See id. at para. 3.

Number 3]

RETRANSMISSION CONSENT

631

extending to non-cable entities the prohibition on deleting or repositioning
a station during “sweeps”; and 4) eliminating the network nonduplication
136
and syndicated exclusivity rules.
The FCC believes that under the
137
current statutory framework, it has limited tools to respond to impasses.
Thus, the NPRM focuses only on those tools currently within the FCC’s
138
authority.

1. Improving Good Faith Standards
To determine whether negotiations are conducted in good faith, the
FCC established seven objective good faith negotiation standards. A
violation of any of these seven negotiation standards constitutes a per se
139
breach of good faith. The FCC then uses a totality of circumstances test
140
to determine if good faith exists. There have been very few complaints
filed alleging violations of the good faith rules, and only one finding that a
141
party to a retransmission consent negotiation had negotiated in bad faith.
The FCC intended to provide broad standards, but generally left
142
negotiations to the parties.
The FCC believes that additional per se good faith negotiation
standards would increase certainty of what constitutes a failure to negotiate
in good faith and would promote the successful completion of
143
negotiations.
As such, it seeks comment on additional per se
144
standards,
whether there are additional actions that might constitute
145
rebuttable presumptions of bad faith,
and whether the FCC should
146
impose additional penalties for failure to negotiate in good faith. Finally,
136. Id.
137. Id. at 46 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
138. Id. (“The Notice we issue today asks whether there are changes within the
Commission’s existing authority that can improve the process for companies negotiating
commercial deals . . . .”) (emphasis added).
139. 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1) (2010).
140. Id. § 76.65(b)(2).
141. Choice Cable T.V. was found to have breached the duty to negotiate in good faith
when it replaced WLII’s station signal with WORA’s station signal without a valid
retransmission consent agreement with WORA. See Letter from Steven Broeckaert, Deputy
Chief, Media Bureau, to Jorge L. Bauermeister, Counsel for Choice Cable T.V., 22 F.C.C.R.
4933 (2007).
142. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 20.
143. Id. at para. 21.
144. These include the proper scope of network involvement in negotiations, joint
retransmission consent negotiations by stations not commonly owned, refusals to put forth
bona fide proposals, refusals to agree to nonbinding arbitration, and what constitutes
unreasonable delay. Id. at paras. 22–26.
145. Id. at para. 30.
146. Id.
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the FCC seeks comment on revising the “‘totality of the circumstances’
standard,” keeping in mind that it “[did] not intend the totality of the
circumstances test to serve as a “back door” inquiry into the substantive
147
terms negotiated between the parties.”
Both sides of the dispute generally agree that modifying the existing
good faith regulations would be helpful. Many parties suggest their own
148
specific per se violations.
Others put forth suggestions of what should
149
not be a per se violation of good faith.
While obviously all of the
suggested violations or nonviolations could not be included within the
regulations, it is clear that more guidance is necessary in the area of good
faith requirements.

2. Revision of Notice Requirements
Under Section 534(b)(9), a cable operator must provide notice to a
local commercial TV station thirty days before deleting or repositioning the
150
151
station.
Notice must also be provided to the cable subscribers.
The
current notice requirements apply only to cable operators (not to other
152
MVPDs) and are only required when service is actually disrupted. Only
when the station both fails to give proper notice and the station is actually
153
deleted is there a violation.
The FCC seeks comment on whether to revise the notice requirements
so as to provide notice of a potential deletion and whether such notice
should be given regardless of whether the station’s signal is ultimately
154
deleted. Under the proposed approach, if the parties have not reached a
new agreement prior to thirty days from the agreement’s expiration, notice

147. Id. at paras. 31–32 (quoting Good Faith Order, supra note 45, at para. 32).
148. Cablevision Comments, supra note 85, at 2–3 (suggesting that broadcasters must
charge nondiscriminatory and transparent rates without tying consent to carriage of other
programming); Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 24 (suggesting that networks should be
prohibited from interfering in retransmission consent negotiations); Comments of Public
Knowledge and New Am. Found. at 8, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to
Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Public
Knowledge Comments] (suggesting that repeatedly insisting on month-to-month
retransmission consent agreements or the purchase of other programming services to
retransmission consent should be per se violations).
149. E.g., Nexstar Comments, supra note 110, at 23 (suggesting that there should be no
per se violation for refusal to put forth bona fide proposals because this would inject the
FCC into the middle of negotiations).
150. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(9) (2006).
151. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1601 (2010).
152. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 35.
153. Id.
154. Id. at para. 37.
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155

must be given to consumers. The FCC also seeks comment on whether
such notice would help avoid station deletions; by what means such notice
should be given; how to prevent notice from becoming so frequent that
consumers discount the notice; and whether notice is required if parties
156
agree to an extension pending further negotiations.
In the NPRM, the FCC noted that benefits to enhanced notice include
“providing consumers with sufficient time to obtain access to particular
broadcast stations by alternative means, and encouraging the successful
completion of renewal retransmission consent agreements more than 30
157
days before an existing agreement expires.”
Lack of notice deprives
consumers of the necessary information needed to make informed
158
decisions.
The point of advanced notice requirements is to protect the
159
consumers who lose stations, not the broadcasters or MVPDs.
Broadcasters overwhelmingly support advanced notice requirements as
160
their preferred solution in the current dispute.
However, notice might be unnecessarily costly and disruptive,
161
especially when no disruption occurs. Some commenters think enhanced
notice would result in “unnecessarily alarming consumers and public
officials, making negotiations increasingly contentious, providing
broadcasters and rival MVPDs with more time to encourage customers to
switch MVPDs, and causing customers who do switch to bear the
associated costs unnecessarily if the negotiations are resolved without
162
service disruption.”
Enhanced notice requirements might also “sow
163
confusion and fear amongst consumers.”
Additionally, notice of
impending impasses can serve as a “further front in the retransmission
consent war” if it is used primarily as an “ad hominem attack[]” on the
164
other party.
Cable providers generally oppose notice requirements,
believing they would cause MVPDs to be more vulnerable to broadcaster
165
demands.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at para. 36.
158. Nexstar Comments, supra note 110, at 26.
159. Id. at 27.
160. See e.g., NAB Comments, supra note 88, at iii, 71; Nexstar Comments, supra note
110, at v.
161. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 34.
162. Id. at para. 36.
163. Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 29.
164. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 37.
165. Cablevision Comments, supra note 85, at 4.
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3. Extending “Sweeps” Prohibition to Non-Cable MVPDs
Currently, Section 534(b)(9) provides that there can be no deletion or
repositioning of a station during a period in which major television ratings
166
services measure the size of audiences of local TV stations (“sweeps”).
But there is some confusion as to whether a broadcaster can force a cable
provider to delete the broadcaster’s signal when the retransmission
167
agreement expires during sweeps. This sweeps prohibition is imposed on
cable operators only, and nothing in the statute suggests that Congress
168
intended to impose a reciprocal obligation on broadcasters. Prohibiting
broadcasters from withholding retransmission consent during sweeps
would be contrary to the requirement in Section 325(b) of express consent
169
by the broadcaster.
The FCC notes existing confusion about the current sweeps rule and
invites comment on whether to extend the sweeps rule to broadcasters and
170
non-cable MVPDs (such as DBS providers). The FCC would extend the
sweeps prohibition to non-cable MVPDs in order to “achieve regulatory
171
parity between cable systems and other MVPDs.”
However, the FCC
172
doubts its authority to impose a sweeps limitation on broadcasters. The
NPRM invites comments on this analysis.
Cable providers suggest the rule should be either eliminated or
173
applied in a more reciprocal manner.
As one commenter puts it,
“[c]hanges that may assist only some and not others, whether a broadcaster
174
or a MVPD, will not serve the public interest.”
The current rule does
little to encourage market-based negotiations and instead places yet another
175
burden on MVPDs. Assuming that MVPDs are already at a disadvantage
176
in market negotiations, this gives broadcasters additional leverage.

166. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(9) (2006).
167. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 39.
168. Id. (“[T]he legislative history explains that ‘[a] cable operator may not drop or
reposition any such station during a “sweeps” period when ratings services measure local
television audiences.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 86 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1219)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at paras. 40–41.
171. Id. at para. 41.
172. Id. at para. 40.
173. E.g. id.
174. Reply Comments of Hubbard Brdcsting., Inc. at 2, Amendment of the Comm’n’s
Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June 27, 2011).
175. Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 28.
176. Id.
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4. Elimination of Network Nonduplication and Syndicated
Exclusivity Rules
Network nonduplication rules permit a broadcast station with
exclusive rights to network programming to prohibit a cable system from
carrying the programming as broadcast by any other station within a
177
designated area.
Syndicated exclusivity rules allow a station “within a
specified geographic zone to prevent a cable system from carrying the same
178
syndicated programming aired by another station.”
Together, these
“exclusivity rules” give broadcasters the ability to “prohibit a cable system
179
from carrying another station with the same programing.”
The FCC seeks comment on whether eliminating the rules would
“help to minimize regulatory intrusion in the market, thus better enabling
180
free market negotiations.” It also seeks comment on whether the benefits
of the rules are outweighed by the negative impact on retransmission
consent negotiations, whether exclusivity should be left completely to the
private market with no FCC enforcement mechanism, and whether the rules
181
have a negative impact on localism.
Alternatively, the FCC suggests
changing the rules so that they only extend to television stations that have
already granted retransmission consent and are actually carried on the cable
182
system.
Broadcasters argue that the exclusivity rules should not be eliminated,
citing that their purpose has historically always been to preserve
183
localism. The rules are “essential to the health of local television stations
184
and their ability to serve the public.” The rules also protect investments
in programming, and its elimination would merely permit duplication of
185
already existing programming. Furthermore, eliminating the rules might
have little effect on retransmission consent negotiations because private
186
exclusive contracts between the parties would still exist. Eliminating the
rules will not give MVPDs more partners to negotiate with, but would
rather raise the cost of enforcing the contractual right, which in turn would
187
raise retransmission fees.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 42.
Id.
Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 22–23.
NRPM, supra note 1, at para. 44.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Public Knowledge Comments, supra note 148, at 10.
Tribune Comments, supra note 91, at 1.
Id. at 5–6.
NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 43.
Nexstar Comments, supra note 110, at 28.
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Cable providers believe the FCC should eliminate the exclusivity
rules and allow them to import distant signals when retransmission consent
188
impasses occur. Even without exclusivity rules, MVPDs will prefer local
189
broadcast stations over out-of-market stations. MVPDs will only turn to
out-of-market stations when the price demanded by the broadcaster exceeds
190
the value of its signal. Therefore, eliminating the exclusivity rules would
ensure the local station gets the value from retransmission consent it
191
deserves without demanding too high a price.
This will not adversely
affect localism because “local broadcasters would be incentivized to invest
more in local programming in order to make the adjacent market affiliate’s
192
[programming] a poor substitute.” Eliminating the exclusivity rules “will
foster more market-based negotiations” and “will enable video providers to
193
deliver must-have programming content to their subscribers.”

B.

Non-FCC Proposals

In addition to the FCC’s proposals, which have yet to be acted upon,
there are two other proposed solutions. Specifically, they are interim
194
carriage and mandatory binding arbitration. While MVPDs pushing for
these two solutions argue the FCC does indeed have the authority to
195
implement them, the FCC itself regularly denies such authority.
Thus,
any implementation of these two proposals will require action by Congress.
This section of the Note discusses these two additional proposals and
examines whether the FCC has the necessary authority to implement them.

1. Interim Carriage
Currently, once the retransmission agreement between a broadcaster
and cable provider expires, the broadcaster can immediately pull the
196
signal. Harm is immediate—consumers lose stations, broadcasters suffer
197
from declines in ratings and advertising revenue,
and cable providers
188. Cablevision Comments, supra note 85, at 4; Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at
22, 24.
189. Cablevision Comments, supra note 85, at 24–25.
190. Id. at 24–25.
191. Id. at 25.
192. Reply Comments of Dish Network L.L.C. at 6, Amendment of the Comm’n’s
Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June 27, 2011).
193. Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 22.
194. See, e.g., Petition, supra note 48.
195. NPRM, supra note 1, at 2763 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
196. Petition, supra note 48, at 35.
197. Comments of Comm Corp. of Am. at 3, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011)
[hereinafter CCA Comments].

Number 3]

RETRANSMISSION CONSENT

637

198

lose their ability to compete effectively on price. Interim carriage would
override the requirement of express consent of the broadcaster in
retransmitting the signal and would require the signal to be kept on the
cable system after the agreement expires.
In the Petition, cable providers argue that interim carriage is a fitting
solution to the retransmission consent dispute, as it will “curb broadcaster
199
misconduct under the current system.” They believe that interim carriage
200
“would serve the essential function of maintaining the status quo,”
as
well as help achieve the dual goals of eliminating broadcaster
201
brinkmanship and fulfilling the government’s interest in localism.
Interim carriage would “promote an environment in which good faith
202
negotiations between parties could occur.”
More importantly, interim
carriage would protect consumers from the loss of valued broadcast
203
stations while providers work out the details of their agreements,
and
204
would preserve the public interest.
205
Broadcasters oppose interim carriage.
They believe that when
government intervention is imminent, MVPDs have no incentive to
206
compromise or to avoid delay. As one commenter put it, “[i]f MVPDs
can invoke federal power to compel carriage, they will have very little
207
incentive to negotiate for carriage.”
Broadcasters also argue that
decisions to withhold retransmission consent are consistent with their
public interest obligations, and therefore, interim carriage cannot be
208
imposed on the basis of such obligations.

2. Mandatory Binding Arbitration
The second proposed solution would require parties to submit to
mandatory arbitration whenever an impasse occurs in the retransmission
198. Petition, supra note 48, at 36.
199. Id. at 31.
200. Id. at 37.
201. Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at 21.
202. Comments of the Org. for the Promotion & Advancement of Small Telecomms.
Cos. et al., at 25, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent,
FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011).
203. Comments of Am. Cable Ass’n at 76, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related
to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011).
204. Public Knowledge Comments, supra note 148, at 4.
205. See NAB Comments, supra note 88.
206. CCA Comments, supra note 197, at 3.
207. Joint Comments of Small- & Mid-Sized Mkt. Brdcsters. at 9, Amendment of the
Comm’n’s Rules Governing Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May
27, 2011).
208. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 21.
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consent negotiation. Arbitration would be necessary once it was shown that
“negotiations had broken down and that the parties could not agree on price
209
or other terms and conditions of carriage.”
The proponents of this
solution argue that no showing of bad faith should be required to trigger
210
dispute resolution proceedings.
Cable providers argue that mandatory binding arbitration would serve
the same purposes as interim carriage, namely tackling rising
211
retransmission rates and broadcaster brinkmanship.
Mandatory binding
arbitration is one way to address the abuse of market power that
212
“animate[s] many retransmission consent negotiations today.”
Additionally, the FCC has at least once before ordered mandatory binding
213
arbitration and provided procedures for a remedy. Although that dispute
involved consent to transfer control, not retransmission consent, it signals
that such procedures are at least feasible. Without mandatory binding
arbitration or interim carriage, the FCC’s only enforcement mechanism is
214
the “imposition of forfeiture penalties.”
Broadcasters oppose mandatory binding arbitration as they do interim
carriage. They believe that encouraging parties to wait for the conclusions
215
of a third party will result in more blackouts. This is because bringing a
216
third party into the negotiation would likely introduce more delays and
217
create incentives for MVPDs to refuse to come to reach agreements.
Furthermore, mediation would pit the parties as adversaries rather than
218
focusing their efforts on reaching an agreement. While mediation should
still be available to those parties who choose it, it should not be required, as
it “introduces far more risk of delay and doubt than likelihood of
219
success.”
Rather, “the FCC should defer to the parties to choose their
own forum and procedures for handling retransmission consent
220
negotiations and disputes.”
209. Petition, supra note 48, at 32.
210. Id. at 32–33.
211. Id. at 31.
212. Public Knowledge Comments, supra note 148, at 6.
213. News Corp. Order, supra note 76, at para. 222.
214. Public Knowledge Comments, supra note 148, at 9.
215. See CBS Comments, supra note 115, at 18, 23.
216. Comments of Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc. & Fox TV Stations, Inc. at 24, Amendment of
the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel.
May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Fox Comments].
217. Comments of The Walt Disney Co. at 4, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011).
218. Fox Comments, supra note 216, at 24.
219. Id. at 26.
220. NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 30.
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3. Does the FCC Have the Necessary Authority?
Those advocating for interim carriage and mandatory binding
arbitration insist the FCC can derive such authority from Section 325 or
221
Section 303(r) of the Communications Act.
However, and much more
importantly, the FCC doubts its own authority to enact rule changes outside
222
the four proposed in the NPRM. Quite often throughout the NPRM, the
223
FCC asserts that it does not have the power to enact certain regulations.
Chairman Genachowski explicitly states that the FCC does not have the
authority to adopt interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding
224
dispute resolution procedures.
While the FCC recognizes that interim carriage might best protect
consumers, it concludes that the statute does not authorize such a
225
mandate.
The plain language of the statute prohibits retransmission
without the broadcaster’s express consent, and the legislative history
indicates that Section 325(b) was not intended to dictate the outcome of
226
any negotiations. Therefore, the FCC’s interpretation of Section 325(b)
prevents it from ordering carriage over the objection of the broadcaster,
227
even if the requirement of good faith has been violated. The FCC sees no
authority “to adopt regulations permitting retransmission during good faith
228
negotiation.”
The FCC also believes ordering mandatory binding
arbitration would be inconsistent with Section 325, which opts for
retransmission consent negotiations to be handled by private parties, and
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which only authorizes an
229
agency to use arbitration when all parties consent.
Whatever one’s personal opinions about the power of the FCC to
enact these two proposals, it is clear that so long as it denies its own power
to do so, the FCC will be very unlikely to enact such. Therefore, if interim
carriage and mandatory binding arbitration are desirable solutions, it will

221. Petition, supra note 48, at 38.
222. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 3 n.6.
223. See id. at 50–51 (statement of Comm’r Mignon L. Clyburn) (“[U]nder current
authority given to us by Congress we may not intervene outside of or further than the
aforementioned good faith considerations.”); see also id. at 49 (statement of Comm’r Robert
M. McDowell) (“I agree with the conclusion . . . that the Commission lacks authority to
mandate interim carriage.”).
224. Id. at 46 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
225. Id. at paras. 17–18.
226. Id. at para. 18.
227. Id.
228. Good Faith Order, supra note 45, at para. 60.
229. NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 18.
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230

require statutory change by Congress.
Congress must choose to
“overhaul” the rules the FCC uses to address retransmission negotiations,
231
and the FCC can “react accordingly.”
At least one Senator, John Kerry (D-MA), has proposed a bill that
232
makes “the [FCC] a mediator, but not arbitrator, of the disputes.” Frank
Lautenberg (D-NJ) has also agreed to work on a legislative change to the
233
rules. At the same time, however, other policymakers continue to urge
234
the FCC to act upon the NPRM,
possibly indicating that they either
believe the FCC has more authority than it realizes, or that interim carriage
and mandatory binding arbitration are not desirable solutions. The current
lack of consensus by Congress to inquire into their own role in the
retransmission consent problem further complicates the issue of what the
proper solution is.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
While the NPRM is pending, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has
cautioned that the proceeding is not a signal or excuse for parties to “drag
235
their feet on reaching retransmission consent agreements.”
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell cautioned that negotiating parties
should not use the NPRM as an excuse to stop negotiating and that nobody
236
should assume the FCC will act in a particular way. However, the recent
blackouts show that without immediate action, these cautions are falling on
deaf ears. The FCC has consistently emphasized its commitment to the
public interest, but signal blackouts are clearly harming the public interest.
The time for inaction is over, and something must be done.
In the majority of retransmission consent negotiations, an agreement
is reached peaceably. In these negotiations, the current rules are working as
intended. It is only the highly contentious disputes—the ones that lead to
threatened or actual blackouts—that require government intervention. The
changes adopted must then serve two primary purposes: to clarify the role
of the negotiating parties in a retransmission consent negotiation; and to
230. Id. at 46 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
231. Id. at 2767 (statement of Comm’r Mignon L. Clyburn).
232. Is There a Role for Government in Retransmission Disputes?, BENTON FOUND.
(Nov. 18, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://benton.org/node/45181.
233. Dave Seyler, New Jersey Senator Signs on for Legislated Retransmission Solution,
RBR-TVBR (Oct. 30 2010), http://rbr.com/new-jersey-senator-signs-on-for-legislatedretransmission-solution/.
234. John Eggerton, Rep Bass Asks FCC to Complete Retransmission Proceeding,
BENTON FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://benton.org/node/94808.
235. NPRM, supra note 1, at 2763 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski).
236. Id. at 2766 (statement of Comm’r Robert M. McDowell).
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prevent signal blackouts. Clarifying the parties’ roles will ensure that
negotiations that can be solved amicably remain so, as well as provide
guidance for future negotiations to follow this peaceful pattern. It will also,
to the extent possible, ensure that the negotiations take place primarily
between private parties. Preventing signal blackouts will eliminate
consumer harm caused by cable provider and broadcaster conduct.
Some of the FCC proposals should be adopted. Current confusion
237
regarding good faith
makes it necessary that good faith standards are
revised. The FCC should take into account good faith proposals of cable
providers, broadcasters, and consumers, and then determine which of them
238
will best promote the goals of “honesty, purpose and clarity of process.”
By revising the good faith standards, each party becomes more aware of its
responsibilities in the negotiation, and agreements can be reached without
the use of harmful bad faith tactics.
The notice requirements should be expanded to reduce consumer
confusion. Consumers deserve to know when they are about to be subjected
to a signal blackout. This transparency of information will incentivize cable
providers to reach new agreements before the expiration of their existing
agreements. To ensure that this tool is not abused by broadcasters, the
revised good faith requirements should emphasize that notice is not a
weapon, and that the parties should be acting in good faith long before
notice is necessary. Finally, the exclusivity rules should not be eliminated,
because the interests of localism outweigh other interests implicated by this
proposal. Since they arise out of contractual right, the elimination of the
239
exclusivity rules will have minimal effect.
Moreover, as discussed
below, concerns of cable providers regarding the exclusivity rules will
largely be alleviated by the imposition of interim carriage.
These changes, which arguably favor broadcasters, must be
counteracted by legislative action. As long as the foregoing solutions are
the only ones available to the FCC, it is arguable that they further tip the
balance in favor of broadcasters. To prevent this, the FCC needs to be able
to order the drastic solutions of interim carriage and mandatory binding
arbitration when negotiations become contentious. These two solutions will
level the playing field and prevent cable providers from accepting
240
unfavorable proposals. The two solutions are of the type that would not
be adopted unless there were truly no amicable solution in the
retransmission negotiation. These solutions—especially interim carriage—
237.
238.
239.
240.
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would eliminate blackouts and threatened blackouts, thus fulfilling the
241
second purpose of the solutions.
For these two solutions to be adopted, Congress must legislate.
Congress, in the way it finds most beneficial, must extend to the FCC the
necessary authority to adopt interim carriage and mandatory binding
arbitration. How it does so remains a question for the debate floor. But
Congress needs to give the FCC the authority that the FCC believes it
lacks. The FCC could then implement these two solutions to appease cable
providers and hopefully solve otherwise irreconcilable negotiations.
As this year’s retransmission negotiations come to a close, predictably
with some ending peaceably and others ending in signal blackouts, the FCC
and Congress remain poised to finally adopt changes to ensure the system
of retransmission continues to run smoothly in the current marketplace and
fulfills the goals of the system. A combination of proposals adopted from
the NPRM, as well as legislative change providing for interim carriage and
mandatory binding arbitration in extreme circumstances, may well be the
best option to level the playing field and eliminate consumer harm.

241. Id. at para. 50.

